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DOES "PRACTICALITY" HAVE A PLACE IN 
THE "CANON OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW"? 
Russell L. Weaver* 
In this article, I talk about a hodge-podge of things that I do 
in my constitutional law classes and books. I am not sure that 
they rise to the lofty title of "The Canon of Constitutional Law," 
but I view them as worthwhile and worth discussing. 
I. DIALOGUE 
In our constitutional law casebook, one thing we do is to 
engage in a dialogue among the authors.1 I cannot take credit 
for this innovation; it was Don Lively's idea. We have a diverse 
group of authors (racially, sexually and ideologically) with quite 
different perspectives on constitutional issues, and this diversity 
produces very interesting discussions. We hope that the discus-
sions benefit our students. 
For example, the debate on affirmative action is intense.2 
Don Lively questions the "wisdom of reliance upon legal innova-
tion to fix an acute societal pathology.''3 I question the permissi-
bility and desirability of race-based affirmative action, and argue 
that it should be replaced by programs that favor the economi-
cally disadvantaged.~ I point out that such programs would have 
greater impact, yet "disproportionately favor" African-
Americans and Hispanics, but would "generate less hostility 
since they function on a race neutral basis."5 Dorothy Roberts 
and Phoebe Haddon articulate passionate defenses of race-based 
* Professor of Law, Louis D. Brandeis School of Law, University of Louisville. 
1. See Donald E. Lively, et al., Constitutional Law: Cases, History, and Dialogues 
(Anderson, 2d ed. 2000). 
2. See id. at 808-14. 
3. ld. at 809. 
4. ld. at 809-10. 
5. ld. at 810. 
341 
342 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 17:341 
affirmative action programs.6 Bill Araiza argues that "as long as 
there is a reasonable showing of real, explicit or structural his-
torical discrimination with likely effects persisting to the present 
day, the equality principle of the Fourteenth Amendment must 
allow legislative attempts at focused race-conscious relief."7 
II. BLENDING 1HEORY AND PRACTICE 
One of my constitutional law objectives is to blend theory 
and practice. I have done this for many years in my non-
constitutional law classes.8 In recent years, I have carried this 
blending over to my constitutional law classes and to a forth-
coming First Amendment casebook.9 
Why do I worry about "practice" and "practical things?" 
After all, constitutional law is one of the few places where we 
can focus on the arcane without fear of criticism. I do so for a 
variety of reasons. First, in light of the Macerate Report/0 I 
have tried to integrate "skills training" into substantive classes. I 
realize that the Macerate Report seeks more, but I place my 
students in "practical situations" so that they are better prepared 
for practice. Second, and perhaps more importantly, I believe 
that practical problems reinforce theory and help students take 
the theory to a deeper level. 
Permit me to provide an example. In Kentucky, the estab-
lishment clause is a hot issue. Despite the United States Su-
preme Court's holding in Stone v. Graham,11 one Kentucky 
school district refused to take down the Ten Commandments. 
During the last year, nine other districts have re-posted the 
Commandments. From a "theory" perspective, one can easily 
say that all of these districts are acting unconstitutionally. Some 
of the districts have tried to distinguish Stone using what I con-
6. Id. at 810-13. 
7. Id. at 814. 
8. See generally Russell L. Weaver, et al., Modern Remedies: Cases, Practical 
Problems and Exercises (West, 1997); William F. Funk, Sidney A. Shapiro, and Russell L. 
Weaver, Administrative Procedure and Practice: Problems and Cases (West, 1997); see 
also Russell L. Weaver, et al., Criminal Procedure: Theory Practice and Procedure (forth-
coming West, 2001). 
9. See Russell L. Weaver and Arthur D. Hellman, The First Amendment (forth-
coming, Lexis Pub., 2001). 
10. See Robert McCrate, Chairperson of Task Force, Legal Education and Profes-
sional Development-An Educational Continuum: Report of the Task Force on LAw 
Schools and the Profession: Narrowing the Gap (American Bar Assoc. Sec. of Legal 
Educ. and Admissions to the Bar, July 1992). 
11. 449 u.s. 39 (1980). 
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sider to be makeweight arguments (i.e., the postings are permis-
sible because copies of the Ten Commandments are paid for and 
posted by private groups). Nevertheless, those who want to 
challenge the postings face intense practical problems. Many of 
the districts where the Ten Commandments are posted are small 
communities with strong social pressures, and no one who has 
standing is willing to be a plaintiff. So, I ask my students to as-
sume that they are in practice, and ask them how they can rem-
edy this unconstitutional practice. Are there ways around the 
standing problem? For example, is it possible to sue the Ken-
tucky Department of Education and join individual school dis-
tricts as defendants? Are there other ways to obtain standing? 
Unless these "practical" problems can be solved, Stone's injunc-
tion is meaningless. Students need to realize this. They also 
need to think about whether, if no one in the community objects, 
we should care. 
In the last week, a bill was introduced in the Kentucky Leg-
islature that would authorize a school district's voters to decide 
whether the Ten Commandments may be posted in classrooms 
in that district. Does this bill make a difference? If Kentucky 
passes the law, might it be possible to challenge the law and join 
individual districts? 
For a second example, I use a state park that has erected a 
Christmas display on park grounds. The display contains non-
Christian displays including Frosty the Snowman, Rudolf the 
Red-Nosed Reindeer, Santa Claus, Mrs. Claus, Santa's house, 
elves, decorated Christmas trees (decorated in a secular fashion), 
along with lighted reindeer, candy canes, and a sleigh. This is a 
large display, which covers several miles, and visitors drive 
through it. A visitor complains that the park has taken the 
"Christ out of Christmas." She asks the park to include a creche 
containing the baby Jesus surrounded by the three wise men and 
camels. Alternatively, if the park is unwilling to erect the creche 
itself, she would like for the park to permit her to erect one on a 
piece of land set aside for that purpose. The woman is sup-
ported by a Christian legal foundation which intends to sue if her 
demands are not met. I ask the students to assume that they are 
representing park officials, and to think about how they would 
respond to the demands. May the park erect a creche as part of 
the display? May it allow the complainant to set up her own dis-
play? What are the downsides of each approach? What hap-
pens if the park allows the complainant to erect a display, and 
then the Ku Klux Klan asks for permission to put up a cross? 
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Would the park have to grant the Klan's request, or could it 
grant the complainant's request and deny the Klan's? So, how 
do you advise park officials about how to proceed? 
In the affirmative action area, I ask students to examine and 
evaluate the University of Louisville's affirmative action pro-
gram. For students, those programs include race-based scholar-
ships available only to African-American students, and a doc-
toral aid program which provides tuition reimbursements and 
stipends to African-Americans pursuing advanced degrees. On 
faculty hiring, the University's policies require the hiring of Afri-
can-Americans. If a recruitment committee is under an affirma-
tive action obligation, and it finds a "qualified" African-
American candidate, it is required to hire that candidate (or an-
other African-American candidate). The Committee is not al-
lowed to make comparative assessments between African-
American candidates and caucasians (or, for that matter, mem-
bers of other races). It does not matter whether the Committee 
views the African-American candidate as "barely qualified" and 
some of the other candidates as "outstanding" or "sensational." 
The Committee is still required to recommend that the African-
American candidate be hired. 
As a general rule, after my students read the University's 
official policies, many of them are angry. They feel that the pro-
grams unfairly discriminate against some citizens based on their 
skin color, and that the programs are therefore unconstitutional. 
Initially, I ask students to focus on the theoretical, and I try to 
get them to do a number of things. First, I want them to con-
sider the history of discrimination in Kentucky. Most of my stu-
dents are too young to have experienced either slavery or segre-
gation. However, they do have a background of personal 
experience relating to race. In addition, there is a consent de-
cree between the Commonwealth and the United States De-
partment of Education which details the history of segregation in 
the state. So, I ask students to consider the decree, which states 
that there were segregative acts through the 1950s, and that the 
system was not desegregated until the early 1980s. Second, once 
students understand the history, we talk about a variety of other 
theoretical issues: Why did affirmative action programs come 
into existence? What "ills" were they trying to remedy? Have 
the programs remedied those ills? Effectively? Ineffectively? 
At what costs? 
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Finally, I present students with problems. For example, at 
the University of Kentucky (UK), a Hispanic student was turned 
down for a "minority" scholarship on the basis that such aid is 
only available to African-Americans. The Hispanic student 
wanted to sue. I ask the students to assume that they are in 
practice, and encourage them to think about how they would 
handle this case. How would they begin? Do they need to in-
vestigate the facts? If UK does discriminate against Hispanics, is 
the discrimination justified or permissible? What must be shown 
in order for it to be permissible? Is it enough to show that there 
is a history of discrimination against African-Americans in 
higher education in Kentucky? Does it matter how long ago that 
discrimination occurred? Does it matter whether there has been 
discrimination against Hispanics in higher education in Ken-
tucky? Would it matter that "minority" scholarships are being 
given to African-Americans from California or New York (who, 
presumably, did not suffer discrimination in Kentucky)? 
Finally, if students conclude that UK is in violation of the 
Constitution, I want them to think about how they would ap-
proach the matter in practice. Can they simply file suit against 
UK? Do they have to communicate with UK first? Even if 
communication (i.e., a demand letter) were not required, is there 
something desirable about "talking" before suing? Might it be 
possible to resolve the matter without litigation? 
III. EXERCISES 
We are also including exercises in our forthcoming First 
Amendment casebook. We try to put students in situations like 
those they may encounter in practice, and ask them to prepare 
written documents relating to those situations. The course is 
graded on the basis of class participation and exercises. 
By the time students take constitutional law at my school, 
they are second year students. They have already taken lots of 
exams, and have demonstrated many of the basic skills tested by 
such exams (i.e., the ability to "spot" legal issues, to "state" their 
knowledge of the law, and to accurately "apply" the law to these 
issues). Since many of these students will be practicing law in a 
short time, I want them to work with the law in simulated situa-
tions. I present students with a constitutional law problem and 
ask them how they would handle the problem. 
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For example, I might present students with an establishment 
clause problem. The City of Louisville recently adopted an or-
dinance prohibiting discrimination in housing and employment 
on the basis of sexual preference. A local doctor who is a devout 
Christian sincerely believes that homosexuality is "sinful" and is 
unwilling to hire a homosexual. The doctor wants to file suit 
against the ordinance because it prohibits him from discriminat-
ing based on sexual preference. I ask students to assume that 
the suit has not been filed, and that the doctor has come to their 
law firm for advice. A senior partner has asked the student to 
write a legal memo evaluating how to best represent the doctor's 
interests. 
I hope that students will discuss a number of legal issues. 
First, since the doctor does not presently have a member of the 
protected class working for him, and has not received a job ap-
plication from one, I hope that students will talk about potential 
standing problems. Whether or not the ordinance transgresses 
the Constitution, should suit be filed now? Must the doctor wait 
until a member of the protected class applies for a job, or until 
he discovers that a member of the class is working for him? I 
also want students to talk about free exercise issues. Does the 
Free Exercise Clause protect the doctor? Are decisions like 
Smith applicable? Can they be distinguished? Under the Ken-
tucky Constitution, does the doctor have a stronger claim (the 
Kentucky Constitution is generally more strict on establishment 
issues, and more protective on free exercise issues)? So, how 
should the doctor proceed? In my class, I also spend time talk-
ing about dispute resolution issues. I would like for students to 
evaluate whether they should simply file suit (after, of course, 
sending a demand letter), or whether it would be helpful to talk 
with City officials. I want students to think about whether there 
is a mechanism for seeking exemptions from the law's require-
ments. 
The potential downside of this testing method is that stu-
dents may not study the substantive material as well as they 
would for a final exam, and therefore will not come away with as 
good an understanding of the basic material. As a result, my 
dean, who also asks students to do take home exercises in an-
other substantive course, supplements the exercises with a final 
exam designed to test the student's knowledge and understand-
ing of basic doctrine. I do not believe that an exam is necessary. 
A properly constructed take home exercise requires a great deal 
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of work, and can require intimate knowledge of the basic doc-
trine. 
Does the take home exercise produce different outcomes? 
In other words, do some students do better on a take home exam 
than they would have done on a traditional final exam? My 
sense is "no." Students who do well (or poorly) on a traditional 
final exam do similarly on a take home exam. The reasons are 
obvious. Students do better on final exams because they have 
better reasoning abilities and better writing skills. Students who 
do poorly generally lack these attributes. These differences re-
veal themselves in either type of testing mechanism. 
Many years ago, at a New Law Teachers' Workshop, a pro-
fessor told an interesting story about law school grading. A 
number of professors at different law schools gave the same 
exam to their students. After the exams were graded, the exams 
were sent to the other professors for regrading (without any in-
dication of the grade given by the first professor). The study 
found that professors at the various schools gave quite similar 
grades. Afterwards, the same exams (again, without any indica-
tion of the grades given by the professors) were given to non-law 
professors, non-lawyers to grade. Once again, the grades given 
were very similar to the grades given by the professors. The 
really interesting thing about the study was that the testers also 
asked an English Ph.D student to take the exam. This was a 
woman who was not a law student, and who had not taken the 
course. Even though students who sat through the course 
earned "Ds" and "Fs" on the exam, the Ph.D student earned a 
low "C." 
